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Abstract
Recent eruptions of ethnic-sponsored conflict throughout the international community
have reintroduced the once-discredited concept of irredentism in foreign affairs, and underlined
the importance of evaluating the evolution of ethnic conflict in the 21st century. As ethnic
movements continually devolve into civil wars, violent stalemates, and icy regional tensions,
scholars and world leaders alike must ask: is irredentism a beneficial and effective policy
option? Why do some nations with prominent diasporas refrain from engaging in irredentism?
What are the factors that enable or inhibit the successful execution of irredentist aims?
This research analyzes two case studies—Russia-Crimea and Greece-Macedonia—in an
effort to identify prominent factors that enable or prevent successful irredentism. The two
variations of evolution—an aggressive takeover and a low-tension rhetorical stalemate,
respectively—offer a unique platform for understanding the internal and regional factors that
influence the composition of irredentist conflict and exploring the significances and
consequences of such action on both the homeland and regional neighbors.

Introduction
The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 is the most recent case that clearly underlines
the intersection of irredentist conflict and ethnic relations in the 21st century. In late 2013, an
intention to shift away from a pro-Russian agenda and realign Ukraine with the Western powers
was met with a wave of corruption scandals, civil unrest, coup attempts, and occupied
administrative buildings that resulted in the removal of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych
from power. To “protect and preserve Russian interests,” Russian President Vladimir Putin
authorized troops to storm and occupy the Crimean peninsula in neighboring Ukraine. This was
denounced quickly by the West as an illegitimate and imperialistic power move, yet Putin cited
the security and protection of ethnic and regional interests as motivations for interference
(Treisman 2016; “Ukraine Crisis” 2014). Not only did the contentious annexation of Crimea
heighten tensions between Russia and the remainder of Ukraine and the Baltic States, but the
UN, NATO, the EU, and the West expressed grave concerns regarding this ethnically-motivated
interference in state sovereignty (Treisman 2016).
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Irredentism once played a prominent role in the organization of territory after the
devolution of empires and conclusions of war. Following the end of World War I, in an attempt
to reunite the ethnic German people, reclaim previously seized territory, and reaffirm German
superiority within the international system, Adolf Hitler’s ethno-nationalist cause ignited an
unforgettable series of devastation, death, and despair for decades to come (“World War II”
2009). A unified German race—albeit a temporary one—brought an onslaught of bloody,
offensive action paved by military tanks and decorated with bullet holes. It also introduced the
much-desired concept of a Greater Germany, which propagated an increase in territory, regional
power and ethnic superiority (“World War II” 2009).
After a period of near-hibernation, ethnic conflict has resurfaced with a vengeance.
Tensions between the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, Catalonia and Spain, and New
Caledonia and France have captured today’s newsfeeds, bringing the debate on selfdetermination, human rights, and ethnic relations to the forefront of international affairs (Antoine
2018; Balfour 2017; Griffiths 2016; Qiblawi 2017).
As witnessed throughout the series of geographic successes and horrific repercussions on
other ethnic groups, the paradox of compelling successes and crippling consequences is not
unusual to cases of irredentism, and it places a unique focus on rational choices made by leading
actors. If irredentist conflict leads to such destruction, why do some nations pursue these
policies? Considering most irredentist conflicts fail to reach their aims, is irredentism truly a
reliable, beneficial, and effective policy to pursue? When reviewing successful and failed cases
of irredentist conflict, which factors enabled the homeland to succeed in reuniting their ethnic
kind, and which factors prevented the aims to be reached?
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This research seeks to elaborate on each of these questions in the following sections,
beginning with analyzing the basic foundations and comparing approaches of irredentism,
imperialism, and secession, before moving on to discuss the framework and methodology
implemented. Based on an analysis of the Russia-Crimea and Greece-Macedonia case studies
through the lenses of various theories of irredentism, this paper will make the following
argument: While previous theories propose that border arrangements, diaspora size, and a history
of regional instability may lead to the success of an irredentist project, the severity of economicpolitical power differentials between states, international organization membership and its
impact on state behavior, and the strength and formation of diaspora relations play a central role
in achieving irredentist success.

Foundations and Definitions
Irredentism
Irredentism, or irredentist activity, is defined as the act of physically reuniting ethnic kin
separated by previously ordained borders, which can be executed through the absorption of
territory, the creation of a new state, or the relocation of existing borders (Ambrosio 2016;
Saideman 2005). These three options, respectively, were witnessed in the 2014 Russian
annexation of Crimea, the 2017 case of Kurdistan’s independence vote, and the multi-century
dispute over the Alsace-Lorraine region of France following the Franco-Prussian War, World
War I, and World War II (“Alsace-Lorraine” 2016; Qiblawi 2017; “Ukraine Crisis” 2014).
In explaining irredentist activity, one central concern remains constant: the fair treatment,
protection, and representation of a states’ diaspora community by the host states. The diaspora
community, constructed of ethnically-related individuals separated from the homeland either by
choice as immigrants, or by force as refugees, continues as a point of contention between rival
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states, and stands as a call-to-action for coordinating and implementing foreign policy (Saideman
2005).
State A (the homeland) must act in good faith that State B (the host state) will protect and
represent the ethnic minority settled in state B: this includes guaranteeing basic human rights,
economic prosperity, and individual freedoms guaranteed to the native majority in the host state.
States may engage in presidential deal-making, weapons trading, and economic investments, or
agree to diplomatic favors such as state dinners, photo-ops, or voting in support of international
moves within UN, NATO, or EU discussion, to maintain friendly neighbor relations and ensure
these protections (Pinkham 2017). However, rationally speaking, states must ultimately act in
their best interests, i.e. the best interests of the majority population, ultimately forfeiting the fair
treatment of minorities. When State A’s faith in State B’s ability to protect and represent their
diaspora community is lost, states are forced to turn to less-than-ideal measures on how to
resolve the conflict and defend the rights of their ethnic kin. Irredentism, intending to physically
reunite the ethnic kin to the homeland, is the most severe of actions.
Often centered around a discussion of power, resources, or ability, the evolution of
irredentist conflict takes many forms and is provoked by both individual and compounding
elements. Based on previous research and popular theories of state power dynamics and conflict
manifestation, the literature supports the factors of economic advantage (and corresponding
political power), the presence of a history of instability, international organization membership,
and diaspora relations as prominent factors within many case studies of irredentism (Ambrosio
2016; Auton 2016; Saideman 2005; Wimmer 2018). In this research, I focus my analysis on
economic-power differentials, international organization membership, and diaspora relations,
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and briefly explore other factors including regional history of instability and the presence of
opportunity through decreased international policing and weak domestic leadership.
Additionally, the process of maturation is unique for each conflict: the most common
types of irredentism include a takeover by aggressive or armed force, peaceful negotiations, a
high-tension violent stalemate, and a low-tension, rhetorical stalemate. This research specifically
highlights two cases: Russia-Crimea, an example of aggressive, armed takeover, and GreeceMacedonia, characterized as a low-tension, rhetorical stalemate. The diversity of these cases, in
addition to many other cases of irredentism, illustrates that irredentist conflict is not required to
be inherently violent: Ireland and Northern Ireland’s peaceful negotiations, authorized
referendums, the UK’s “Handover” of Hong Kong sovereignty to China, and, as witnessed in the
unique case of Kosovo, pressure or recognition from international supporters can each institute a
successful, nonviolent means to an irredentist end (Griffiths 2016; “Handover” 2017).
Throughout history, each case of irredentism has held a diverse series of compounding
causes, shifting power dynamics, and varying final results, but five main theories of explaining
irredentism appear:
1) Structural: Regional makeup and opinion regarding state sovereignty
over self-determination dictate a state’s motivations and success;
2) Realist: Balance of Power relations and acquiescence towards or tolerance of
irredentist states decide how much or how little larger, more powerful states get
away with;
3) Rational Choice: Irredentist concerns or policy may be used as a
diversionary tactic or a strategy to increase a politician’s domestic popularity;
4) Domestic-Level: Authorization to engage is dependent on either the
homogenous ethnic makeup of the domestic population or the
classification of a state as a non-democratic regime devoid of institutional
restraints; and,
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5) Constructivist: Common ethnic identities bolster national unity across
borders and justify the right to reunify the diaspora to the homeland, regardless
of cost (Ambrosio 2016).
The structural approach holds that systems or regions that favor state sovereignty over
self-determination will lead to failed irredentist conflict due to the inability to “override the
inviolability of sovereign borders” (Ambrosio 2016). The realist argument outlines the
importance of power differentials in conflict and the inherent advantages of stronger states. Nazi
Germany’s ability to pressure strong Western states like France and Britain to making territorial
concessions highlights the possibility for tolerance or acquiescence towards more intimidating
states, as compared to weaker states, like Albania, which failed to shift its own post-Yugoslavia
border (Ambrosio 2016).
The rational choice approach illustrates the use of irredentist strategies as a diversionary
technique to distract the public from domestic issues or as a method to rally support for personal
political campaigns “by appealing to nationalist sentiments,” as utilized by Serbian thenpolitician Slobodan Milošević against Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ambrosio
2016). Domestic explanations are contingent on a state having a relatively ethnically
homogenous population, which would ultimately provide a path to irredentism free of domestic
pushback. Further, this theory also suggests that non-democratic regimes are able to engage in
such action because they do not have institutional or bureaucratic restraints, constitutional
protections for minorities, membership to international organizations, nor are they tied to the
Democratic Peace Theory-way of problem-solving (Ambrosio 2016). Finally, the constructivist
approach lends the framework that socially constructed ideas and concepts are “instrumental [to]
determine political outcomes,” as national identity and the draw to be unified prevails over all

6

hesitations and the inherent right and obligation to unify the country justifies action (Ambrosio
2016).
Each of these approaches is clearly outlined in the foundational basis for extended crises
in Europe, the Balkans, Serbia, Armenia, the Baltic States and most notably, Adolf Hitler’s
invasion of Poland and launch into World War II. Irredentist conflict has been responsible for a
significant amount of political, ethnic, and geographic alterations throughout global history.
Some states aim to reunite Diasporas across many existing states, opting for a “Greater” nation,
similar to an empire, as seen in the recent “Greater Serbia” and “Greater Russia” debates
(Ambrosio 2016). Similar to the initial rise in the late 19th and 20th centuries, the present rise of
ethnonationalism, secessionism, populism, and devolution within global politics expresses the
tedious nature of ethnic relations spanning more than one border.
When this reliance on good faith-diplomacy falters, however, and the homeland no longer
believes the interests of their kin are protected, state leaders must choose to discount two major
costs before engaging in irredentist conflict:
1) Domestic political costs: Costs that may hinder the state’s access to power and
ability to succeed in power struggles, or “costs that contribute to the overall
instability of the domestic political situation.” Additionally, states are at risk
for the endangered welfare and well-being of its citizens, and unstable
economic basis (Saideman 2005); and
2) International costs: Applicable both to the state’s role in the international
community or to the international community as a whole, costs sparked by
action or policy include: the loss of alliances, loss of influence—and/or
membership—in international forums, and benefits gained from the
participation with states or IGO (Saideman 2005).
In pursuing irredentist activity, states must overlook corresponding independent or
collective costs, which are significantly detrimental to the short-term and long-term wellbeing of
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a states’ people, governance, or rank in the international power hierarchy. By analyzing the costs
of conflict on GDP, trade partnerships, investment, regime stability and longevity, the probability
of controlled and effective governance of the citizenry, and the human costs that interfere with
education, health, employment, human security, and access to resources in contrast to the rights
of an external group of ethnic kin, leading actors must decide if these actions are rational
(Saideman 2005). In situations where a state or group selects aggressive irredentist policy, it is
suggested their interests lie, first and foremost, in the protection of the diaspora community’s
rights and livelihood.
Imperialism
Imperialism, described as the “state policy, practice, or advocacy [for] extending power
and dominion…specifically by direct territorial acquisition, or by gaining political and economic
control of other areas,” almost always requires the use of military force or coordinated
aggression in order to successfully undermine the legitimacy and sovereignty of a state or region
(“Imperialism” 2017). Alternative sources of aggression or military force may include both
hybrid warfare and sharp power tactics. Each concept compositionally modern and uniquely
concerning, both hybrid warfare and sharp power have introduced new approaches that capitalize
on opportunity and multi-faceted campaigns of propaganda, support for ethno-nationalist groups,
sweetheart weapons deals, electoral interference, and diplomatic enticements (Pinkham 2017).
These strategies effectively delegitimize the domestic sovereignty of a nation’s governing
leaders and quietly coerce territory into its strong-arm counterpart’s possession.
The similarities to irredentism revolve around the concept of ethnic kin and morality. In
an effort to liberate citizens from a tyrannical regime and bless them with the freedoms and
qualities of a superior lifestyle, the imperialistic strong-hold state may intervene to save and
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protect those persecuted under a much freer and morally sound “haven” state (“Imperialism”
2017). Following this logic, comparisons can be extended to irredentist action. State A
intervenes in state B’s affairs—sometimes violently—to free citizens from minority persecution
under an improper regime, thus restoring the citizens’ rights to organization, language,
education, and opportunity, among many other things.
However, it is essential to note that the predominance of imperialist action occurs in
favor of aggressive, security-based motives rather than morality-based interests. Irredentist
action is not required to be violent in nature, while imperialist action often relies on multiple
forms of “aggression” (e.g. propaganda campaigns, manipulative narratives, weakening the state
from within, supporting nationalist groups) to successfully topple the reigning leader or disrupt
their monopoly of power (Klimkin 2017; Pinkham 2017; Walker 2017).
Secession
Secession, like irredentism, is a movement for change that is motivated by both ethnic
tensions and the assertion of the right to self-determination. Defined as “the act of separating
from a nation or state and becoming independent,” secession is uniquely different from the
concepts of irredentism and imperialism (“Secession” 2018). Like imperialism, irredentism is a
movement pursued by the reigning state regime. Secession, however, is crafted at the
community level and waged against the reigning party, most recently witnessed in Catalonia’s
series of formal declarations, protests, and referendums (Griffiths 2016; Minder 2017).
Successful secession relies on the following three key elements:
1) The interests of the State
2) The international recognition of the regime; and,
3) The strategies employed by secessionist movements (Griffiths 2016).
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Additionally, two traditional strategies of movement follow: either the secessionists
target the central government regime, demanding increased rights, autonomy, or the formal right
to referendums; or, the movement ushers support from the international community into the
fight, employing international naming-and-shaming pressure to force the regime’s hand. The
case of Kosovo’s secession, however, introduced a unique third option: the international
community may bypass traditional allegiances and opt to recognize the seceded nation directly,
refusing the homeland’s sovereignty and legitimacy (Griffiths 2016).
Irredentist movements, like secessionist movements, have been privy to ebbs and flows
throughout history. The end of World War II and the advancement of global economies,
weaponry, war strategies, and shifts in social, ideological, and security factors altered states’
interests in maintaining large landmasses. Power-through-geography was no longer necessary
when states could “secure capital and resources, and leverage their competitive advantage”
through economic means (Griffiths 2016).
However, this “adjustment of interests” ignited a swell of ethnic-centered campaigns for
independence. Over 130 states have been established since 1945, and from 2011-2016 over 55
secessionist movements have resurged throughout the world (Griffiths 2016). Most recently,
secession movements by Kurds, Catalans, and New Caledonians rocked 2017, reinforcing the
pressing responsibility to understand the motivations behind, and evolution of, campaigns
focused on ethnic relations, reunification, and independence before violence, chaos, or civil war
erupt (Minder 2017).
Comparing Approaches
I have outlined the divergences between irredentism, imperialism, and secession—in their
simplest forms—as follows:
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1) Irredentism: A state looks to reclaim territory and reunite the ethnic diaspora,
with or without violence, in accordance with the diaspora’s wishes;
2) Imperialism: A state aggressively occupies or annexes a region, without
permission, traditionally for security or personal interests; and,
3) Secession: A minority separates itself from the majority to become an
independent nation.
Every case of ethnic conflict is intricately different than others, regardless of decade or
region. Because of this, it is exceedingly important to note that these three approaches to action
are separated by very fine interpretations of movement, tactics, and motives. These different
narratives continue to be argued and expanded by scholars with the rise of each new ethnic
conflict. For this reason, I have clearly outlined my definitions of each transformation of ethnic
conflict, and the remainder of my paper will reflect the definition and description of irredentism.
The intention is not to dispute the true composition of each case study, but rather to focus on
factors that predict the type of irredentist conflict that arose.

Conceptual Framework
This research acknowledges two main patterns identified in the evolution of irredentist
conflict. Russia’s takeover of Crimea showed an offensive and aggressive façade of irredentism.
In this paper, the Russia-Crimea case study stands as the “successful” example of irredentism, as
ethnic and religious groups were reunited, borders were redrawn, and rights and freedoms were
restored to the “oppressed” diaspora population (Nardelli 2015).
The second pattern, a low-tension stalemate, predominantly rhetorical in nature, describes
the Greece-Macedonia conflict in the Balkans. While the Macedonian diaspora in Northern
Greece has reported severe and frequent human rights abuses, and while each side has clearly
expressed interest over the same geographic region for centuries, no formal military-sponsored
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action has been taken and no aggressive tactics have been employed. For this reason, this case
acts as the “failed” case, as the diaspora has yet to be reunified with the homeland despite severe
oppression and significant denials of human rights (US Bureau of Democracy 2016).
These cases provoke many questions regarding potential impediments to employing a
successful and fruitful irredentist strategy. In exploring Russia-Crimea and Greece-Macedonia,
each with a different “ending” status (for the time being), this research intends to highlight
potential factors that encouraged successful irredentism and discuss reasons successful
intervention may have been prevented.

Methodology
Throughout this research, I chose to analyze two case studies, one of which was a
“success” in irredentist activity, and one of which was a “failure” in irredentist activity; these
correlate with the two case studies of Russia-Crimea and Greece-Macedonia. My main research
question—“If irredentism is a beneficial and effective foreign policy option, what are the main
factors that enable or prevent such success?”—looks to identify and explore a variety of factors
among individual nations and two-state conflicts alike. My intention is to identify three main
“enabling” and “preventative” factors. Given the varied nature of each of these two cases of
irredentism (one an aggressive takeover and one a low-tension stalemate), and due to the
compounding nature of many variables, there may be no definitive pattern of success or failure
across the two selected case studies. I aim to briefly discuss other factors that may hold a
smaller influence over the composition of irredentist conflict before discussing issues associated
with these factors.
Research conducted was obtained primarily from scholarly articles and documents
provided by NGOs, IGOs and governments such as Human Rights Watch and the United States

12

Department of State. I accessed articles and documents from BBC News, Amnesty International,
and the United Nations, in addition to think tank organizations like Foreign Affairs, the Council
on Foreign Relations, and Foreign Policy magazine.
After identifying and discussing the prominent factors in cases of irredentist success and
failure, this research briefly discusses limitations and caveats to my argument and findings. This
research finishes with a discussion on the short-term and long-term consequences to irredentist
action, a comparison of the positives and negatives of this action, and suggestions for foreign
policy.

Case Studies
Russia-Crimea
A cauldron of contentious politics, shifting borders, and empirical reign, the Crimean
peninsula was subjected to raucous ethnic divides, occupation, and annexation for centuries. The
Russian Federation’s recently regenerated strength and comparative power advantage within the
Baltics was complimented by an interest in reuniting ethnic Russian kin forcibly segregated on
the Crimean peninsula (“Crimea Profile” 2018). Instability in Ukraine provided both an
opportunity and a need for intervention, as the livelihoods and the safety of ethnic Russians
became increasingly endangered.
Relations between the native Tatar minority, ethnic Russians, and Ukrainians only
heightened with the return of the Tatar exodus to the peninsula. After the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the once-deported Tatar minority returned looking to reclaim land. The influx of over
240,000 refugees caused serious housing crises, economic strain, scarcity of resources, and a
massive employment crisis (“Crimea Profile” 2018). Ethnic Russians were pushed into
segregated, ghetto-like housing, fostering even more hostility, denial of spoken language, and
social reprisals throughout the Crimean society. These issues only further elevated the imperative
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to realign with the Russian homeland for stability, access to resources, and the security of the
ethnic Russian identity, language, culture, and interests.
However, from 2010 onward, accusations of vote-rigging, fears of corruption, and a shift
in public opinion towards the West from a Russian ally stymied Russian influence in Ukrainian
politics. The loss of critical Russian alliance and Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych
threatened the future guarantees of rights and representation for ethnic Russians in Ukraine.
Over 800,000 ethnic Russians began protesting these changes, and soon the Ukrainian
presidential administration administered bans on the Russian language and the right to protest,
preventing ethnic Russians from attempting to advocate for their interests or assume influence or
roles of leadership within local political offices (“Ukraine Crisis” 2014). Ukrainian elections for
state and local leaders were held, but polling stations were located in regions of Ukraine where
ethnic Russians were absent (“Ukraine Crisis” 2014). After Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovych fled the state and an opportunistic coup attempt failed, the Kremlin granted Russian
President Vladimir Putin permission to legally annex the Crimean peninsula. On March 18,
2014, Crimea returned to the Russian Federation’s control (“Ukraine Crisis” 2014).
However, Moscow’s irredentist concerns did not stop with Crimea. Unrest continued to
rise in the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Novoazovsk regions of Ukraine, each
located along the Russian border and each heavily populated by ethnic Russians (“Ukraine
Crisis” 2014). Each of these four regions quickly moved to implement referendums declaring
independence from Ukraine with the intent to realign the regions with the Russian Federation
once again. Protests and clashes with Ukrainians intensified following the annexation of Crimea,
leading Russia to send humanitarian aid to ethnic Russians located within the Luhansk region of
Ukraine (“Ukraine Crisis” 2014).
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Greece-Macedonia
Similar to that of Ukraine, instability—continuously prompted by Eurasian Ottoman
control, regional wars, civil wars, and irredentist and genocidal activity—has most severely
impacted the internal composition of regional relations within the Balkans. The First Balkan
War (1912-1913) defeat of Bulgaria by Serbia, Greece, and Romania immediately sparked
Bulgarian irredentist activity, causing the Second Balkan War (1913), as Bulgaria attempted to
reclaim lost territory that had been absorbed by the Turks (Allcock 2017). Through
appeasement, the Second Balkan War’s Treaty of Bucharest (1913) partitioned parts of
Macedonia to Bulgaria. From here, Macedonia became the easy target for expanding territory
based of ethnic composition and historical grievances (“Treaty of Bucharest” 2010). Serbia
claimed the northern and central parts of Macedonia and Greece followed, claiming the southern
Macedonian territory.
For decades, Macedonian citizens were subjected to intense assimilation and identity
imposition, severe Serbian colonization, and later, Bulgarian occupation, which heeded the
expulsion of “undesirables” (Danforth 2017). Immediately following World War II, the Greek
Civil War (1946-1949) prompted thousands of Macedonians and Greeks to flee the Greek State,
activating even more severe social tensions and pressing economic crises (Allcock 2017).
The peaceful establishment of the Republic of Macedonia from Yugoslavia in 1991 in a
time of extreme regional inability, civil wars, and violent secession was looked upon as a
positive step for Balkan advancement. However, the Kosovar refugee crisis (1991) caused an
influx of Serbian refugees, costing Macedonia economic stability and foreign investments,
decreasing Macedonian living standards, raising unemployment from 30 percent to over 50
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percent, and increasing security crises between armed Albanian militants and Macedonian
security forces (Allcock 2017).
The Macedonian state has been long unable to recover from a history of partition,
exploitation by larger nations, and multiple waves of refugees. Secession attempts by minorities
within Macedonia’s borders and external attempts to create a Greater Serbia, Greater Bulgaria,
Greater Greece, or Greater Albania, caused the need for forced-hand diplomacy regarding
inadequate protections, most notably recognized in the Greek Naming Dispute that prevents
Macedonia from gaining membership to the EU and NATO organizations (Danforth 1995;
Danforth 2017).
In 2005, the European Community (later renamed the European Union) concluded that
Macedonia met all appropriate criteria for accession and Greece’s objection to the use of the
“Macedonia” name was invalid, as it implied no claim to Greek territory (Danforth 2017).
However, Greece pressured the EC to retract their conclusion and dismiss Macedonia. Per
Greece’s official claims, the “appropriation” of the Macedonian name is a “falsification of
history,” and is viewed as a felony offense (Danforth 1995). The Greece-Macedonian conflict
has been riddled with human rights abuses toward the Macedonian minority throughout the
Northwest region of Greece. The conflicting tensions and naming dispute has led to a
continuous low-violence, rhetorical stalemate for over twenty years (Danforth 2017).
The conflict reaches further than the naming dispute, with Greece implementing an
economic blockade towards Macedonia, which severely devastated the Macedonian population
and dissuaded foreign investment within Macedonia. Greece and Macedonia signed the Interim
Accords in 1995, as Greece agreed to halt the economic blockade and Macedonia made
concessions on their national symbol (Danforth 2017).
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The Macedonian diaspora within Northern Greece has been subjected to a high level of
human rights denials. Freedom of speech, religious freedom, freedom of the press, the right to
assemble, and the right to self-determination have all been heavily policed or denied under the
rule of the Greek political administration. In addition to the international naming dispute that
bans Macedonians from officially being recognized as Macedonians, Greece has implemented
domestic legislative measures that charge ethnic Macedonians with felony convictions if a
Macedonian openly declares themselves Macedonian, as Greece deems it a “plagiarism of the
Greek” identity (Danforth 1995).
Following the Greek civil war, language oaths were implemented within Greek society,
to force Macedonians to renounce their Slavic dialect and subscribe to the Greek language or
face significant repercussions (Danforth 1995). The Macedonian language is recognized as an
official world language by all nations except Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The intensive interest
of imposing homogenous national culture on a diaspora with different, but related, linguistic and
cultural traditions has highlighted the concept of “ethno-specificity,” or declaring allegiance to a
set culture and identity that is distinctly different from neighboring identities. This concept and
process outlines the potential rise of ultra-nationalist groups and intensified ethnic conflict,
especially between diaspora communities in host nations (Danforth 1995).
The Greek government has denied the Macedonian diaspora the right to receive an
education, attend church, and publish radio, TV, or newspapers in their own language. Further,
Macedonians are banned from establishing a cultural organization to promote and protect the
existence of the Macedonian minority and culture—it is against the interests of Greece and
therefore illegal—and Greek law requires police to interfere and disperse any celebrations of
Macedonian heritage, including festivals for folk songs and traditional dance (Danforth 1995).
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Macedonians’ ability to gain employment within Northern Greece is significantly
restricted due to their placement in a small, ghetto-like, undeveloped region of land and a history
of forced displacement, persecution, and the Greek government’s refusal to recognize college
degrees from Macedonian institutions. Activists who protest Greek administration are removed
from their jobs, denied entry into Greece, and deprived of Greek citizenship or protections, as
Macedonians are prohibited from gaining recognition or representation within Greek society
(Danforth 1995). Further, the denial of political amnesty following the Greek civil war, in
conjunction with the 1982 and 1985 laws, prohibited returning Macedonians from reclaiming
property and possessions abandoned while fleeing this unrest, ultimately crippling an alreadystruggling population from achieving economic stability (Danforth 1995).
These extensive abuses on human rights and denials of freedom have afflicted from
150,000 to two million ethnic Macedonians within Greece (Chepkomoi 2016; US Bureau of
Democracy 2016). Falsified census data and limitations on the circulation and content of Greek
censuses has caused much debate over the intensity and prevalence of the Macedonian diaspora
within Greece, only further highlighting the institutionalized denial of representation, selfdetermination, and basic freedoms and rights endowed by the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UNGA 1948).
Comparing the severity and extent of these abuses and infringements on ethnic
Macedonians within Greece to those of ethnic Russians within Crimea and the border regions of
Ukraine, what prevented Macedonia from successfully reclaiming their diaspora, and what
enabled Russia to successfully annex and protect their ethnic kin?

Analysis of Cases
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Inductive reviews of the Russia-Crimea and Greece-Macedonia case studies above reveal
the following patterns:
1) States with greater economic and power advantages are more likely to engage
in, and succeed in, irredentist conflict, while economically weaker states are
more likely to be deterred from engaging in formal ethnic conflict;
2) States with aspirations of joining an international organization may be
dissuaded from engaging in offensive action, but disinterest in and the lack of
membership may enable and assure states to act in their interests without fear
of reprisals; and
3) States that have a high level of domestic support and/or a diaspora community
with a common history of experiences may be more likely to successfully
pursue irredentist action.
While these factors and patterns may be present in the two selected case studies, there
continues to be a smaller selection of minor contributing factors that may also lend influence to
the success of failure of irredentist conflict, especially if paired with another minor or major
factor. The lack of international policing, the weakness of leadership, the presence of a
contentious, conflict-ridden regional history, and the size or dispersal of ethnic kin were each
smaller contributing factors within the two case studies. While these factors are each found
within their respective case studies, their ability to enable or prevent successful irredentist
conflict remains reliant on a combination of other compounding factors.
The following discussion focuses on the three key variables influencing whether
irredentist actions are successful.
Variables
Economic and Power Differentials. The ancient concept of “might” once chronicled the
economic and political power advantage of a state, yet similar ideas remain constant throughout
modern political philosophy and international affairs. Thrasymachus, in Plato’s Republic, claims
that if injustice is “on a large enough scale, [it] is stronger, freer, and more masterly than
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justice,” and that the concept of justice “is nothing but the advantage of the stronger” (Rauhut).
A less philosophical approach to today’s debate on modern power relationships has taken the
forefront, yet still focuses on economic abilities, alliances, and status within the international
hierarchy.
The Realist theory of irredentism, as discussed previously in this paper, cites the balance
of power between states as the most important factor within international conflict (Ambrosio
2016). States with a significant power advantage are easily able to pressure smaller states or
weaker regional neighbors into making severe concessions to border arrangements and state
sovereignty. As Ambrosio discusses, the level of tolerance given to a strong, threatening state
decides the greed and severity of measures pursued throughout an irredentist conflict (2016). If
states look to appease, as previously done with Nazi Germany in the late 1930’s, the aggressive
state will continue to advance and expand their geographic range, thus assuming significantly
more power and legitimacy.
But what makes a state “powerful” in the eyes of other states? Some power is naturally
assumed throughout history as states survive crumbling empires better than their neighbors,
some states benefit more from trade or agriculture, and some states avoided a history of costly
wars; often, power is enlivened by money. Money defines ability, which in turn defines power.
States with higher GDPs are less reliant on outside sponsors for weaponry, resources, or troops,
should a conflict arise. Economic stability and the privilege to be economically autonomous,
without a dire reliance on international trade or outside investment, allows nearly complete
freedom for the state to act in accordance with its own needs at every turn.
Traditionally—although some smaller states have engaged in war with much larger
counterparts—smaller states are unable to afford the economic, political, and social costs of war.
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They are bound by the strategic political and economic risks of losing outside investment or
valuable trade partnerships and jeopardizing crucial political alliances often dissuades smaller
states from engaging in conflict. In cases of irredentism especially, it is too great a risk for too
little a reward (Saideman 2005).
Considering this framework, Russia’s choice to annex Crimea makes sense: Russia
reports nearly $1.28 trillion in GDP per year, much greater than Crimea’s $4.3 million annual
GDP (Factbook 2018). Russia’s supply of gas and monopolization of pipelines creates an even
greater resource-reliance on the state, as well. Crimea’s heterogeneous composition and decades
of ethnic tensions, combined with presidential instability and corruption in Ukraine, only
widened the divide between the refined power advantage Russia had over Crimea.
Additionally, the reputation of Russia within the Baltic States as an untouchable and
uncontrollable wildcard superpower, a history of victories against fellow Baltic neighbors, and
the monopoly over resources clearly outlines the inherent freedoms and appeasement gifted to
the Russian Federation without question. Following the annexation of Crimea, NATO and the
EU moved to impose severe sanctions against Russia as punishment for violating the
international post-war order and rule of law. Yet due to a fear of reprisals and a reliance on
Russian gas, multiple Baltic states refused the sanction agreements (“Sharp Divisions” 2016).
Greece and Macedonia, however, have a uniquely different problem: while Greece
produces nearly 20 times as much GDP (Greece produces $194.6 billion to Macedonia’s $10.9
billion per year), neither nation is economically stable enough to risk engaging in armed conflict.
Greece’s severe financial crisis (2009-2016) caused extreme economic insecurity, high
unemployment, rising poverty, the onset of brain drain, and decreased access to essential services
like healthcare (Amadeo 2018; Rodgers 2015). Additionally, Greece has absorbed over 62,000
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refugees fleeing from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, which only further strained their alreadystruggling economy (IRC 2018). Similarly, Macedonia’s own history of refugee crises and
political instability has plagued the state with extremely high unemployment and poverty rates.
Families rely on remittances sent from sons working in Greece and neighboring states for
survival, giving Greece another piece of economic leverage (Danforth 1995).
Macedonia’s struggle to retain close ties with the United States may be due in part to the
US’s relations with Greece, or because of a return to the America First approach to isolationism,
but Macedonia struggles to maintain necessary powerful alliances that could—or would—
counter Greece or provide assistance to Macedonia in its irredentist fight. Further, Greece’s
blocking of Macedonian membership to NATO gives Greece yet another advantage over
Macedonia, as NATO’s status as a military bloc provides a system of collective defense against
aggressors, and coveted military services such as international liaisons and counter-terrorism
intelligence collection that are unavailable to Macedonia.
The Role of International Organization Membership. While membership within an international
organization like the United Nations, European Union, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization
comes with useful benefits, the rigorous process of accession into these organizations comes with
countless specific requirements, guidelines, and expectations after being admitted.
To join NATO, states must engage in a series of high-level talks with NATO officials
that ensure a state’s dedication to “supporting democratic reforms…the establishment of civilian
and democratic control over military forces…fostering patterns and habits of cooperation,
consultation, and consensus-building…and promoting good neighborly relations” (NATO 2018).
Additionally, states must prove they have:
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1) “a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy;”
2) “the fair treatment of minority populations;”
3) “a commitment to the peaceful resolutions of conflicts;”
4) “the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO
operations;” and
5) “a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional
structures” (NATO 2018).
To join the European Union, states must have:
1) “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities;”
2) “a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and
market forces in the EU;” and
3) “the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of
membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and
monetary union” (“Conditions” 2018).
However, as noted in the European Union’s requirements for membership, states are
required to act in accordance with the values and agendas of the partners, alliances, and investors
of each organization. While the benefits of international organization have long been coveted by
many states, membership ultimately limits states’ freedom of political movement and autonomy
of action. If states do not comply, or if states make unfavorable moves, they risk losing key
political allies, economic investments, or may be hit by crippling sanctions by multiple actors.
Saideman and Ayers theorized that states may not hold international organizations at such
a high value—that interest in joining organizations was on the decline and would not be enough
to deter states from engaging in conflict (2005). Moreover, while they acknowledge
organizational ties may hold some influence over states’ decision-making, they do not believe
states would be obligated to act in accordance with these guidelines and the interests of the
alliance in the face of a growing conflict that threatens the stability of its domestic affairs
(Saideman 2005). However, it is possible that pressures from the international community itself
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may shape the behaviors of states, ultimately deterring them from initially engaging in conflict or
successfully completing the irredentist project (Ambrosio 2001).
The Greece-Macedonia conflict is uniquely tied to this factor, as Macedonia is currently
involved in the first rounds of NATO accession and Greece is dutifully committed to denying
their accession. Greece’s leverage on Macedonia’s membership status has acted as a forcedhand diplomatic route for forcing concessions on behalf of Macedonian interests. By
challenging the name and sovereignty of Macedonia, Greece prevents Macedonia’s accession
into NATO and the EU, while Macedonia’s desperation to join NATO and the EU prevents
Macedonia from engaging in formal or aggressive action towards Greece. Macedonia, to qualify
for NATO and the EU as outlined in the requirements above, must be committed to ensuring the
fair treatment of minorities, protect the human rights of outstanding minorities, and be
committed to peaceful solutions for conflict, officially halting any state-sponsored attempt to
forcefully reunify their diaspora suffering from abuses at the hands of Greek administration.
International organization membership can also work the opposite way: Russia refused to
join NATO or the EU, allowing the state to be free of restricting political ties or alliance
obligations. A lack of membership—and the split membership of neighboring Baltic States—
also prevented Russia from experiencing severe repercussions from NATO and the EU after the
annexation of the Crimean peninsula (“Sharp Divisions” 2014). Consisting of many Western
states, NATO called for strict sanctions following Crimea’s “illegal” and “illegitimate”
annexation in 2014 (Pinkham 2017). However, some NATO states and members of the EU
rejected the proposed sanctions, as they were Baltic States and heavily reliant on Russian gas and
investments (“Sharp Divisions” 2014).
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In this scenario, regional leaders acting on behalf of their most rational interest (energy
security, economic investment) protected Russia from crippling penalties for successfully
carrying out an irredentist strategy. The case of Macedonia reveals that at times, regional actors
(Greece) and aspirations to join organizations (NATO) can prevent states from successfully
reunifying the diaspora to the homeland. Accession requirements, accordance with alliance
rules, and economic-power differentials, however, are not the only factors that enable or prevent
the reunification. The basic foundations of irredentism illustrate the homeland seeking to regain
the diaspora—but does the diaspora community wish to be reunited to the homeland?
Diaspora Relations. The role of the diaspora community in irredentist conflict is a complex and
multi-faceted debate. While many scholars theorize that irredentist conflict is ignited by, or is
successful because of border arrangements, Saideman and Ayers report that borders do not
define the success of irredentist action nor do they sponsor the pursuit of irredentism (2005).
Instead, interstate borders have a unique impact on the status of the diaspora community, their
historical development, cultural awareness, and public opinion towards the homeland (Saideman
2005). In turn, it is a combination of these factors and qualities that may lead to the success of
an irredentist movement.
Border assignments influence the identity of the diaspora, as identities—personal,
societal, and cultural—are shaped by experiences within distinct communities. Separation from
the homeland, whether near or far, can cause a distinct division between two populations of the
same ethnic origin. A resilient, strong sense of identity that connects the diaspora to the
homeland may be imposed due to a long-term, violent conflict (as seen with Palestinians or
Greeks and Turks on the island of Cyprus), which may motivate the homeland to seek
reunification with the diaspora (Saideman 2005).
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On the other hand, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and correspondingly, the
“disintegration of the old Russian Empire” left over 25 million Russians wondering “what it
meant to be Russian” after being displaced outside of Russian borders in the 1990s (Saideman
2005). While this may be true for some Russian diasporas throughout the Baltic States, the
diaspora of ethnic Russians within Crimea remained specifically dedicated to reunification with
the homeland for over 60 years after Crimea’s return to Ukraine in 1954. This may have been
due to the intertwined history of partition and control, the close geographic proximity to the
Russian homeland, or the high concentration—ethnic Russians held the majority at over 65
percent—of ethnic Russians occupying the peninsula (“Crimea Profile” 2018; Factbook 2018).
This concept of “oneness” with the homeland dictates the public opinion, political
agenda, and societal interests of the diaspora community within the host nation and the
surrounding irredentist conflict. The representation of, or intention to represent, the ethnic
diaspora community by the homeland provokes a much higher rate of nationalism and patriotism,
inciting both regional tensions within the host nation and invitations to the homeland to act
(Wimmer 2018). As witnessed in the Ireland-Northern Ireland conflict, a peacefully negotiated
plan for separation of ethnic identities bolstered by religious leaders on both sides of the conflict
who worked to foster the “oneness” connection and cohesiveness of the religious identities
(Sandal 2018). Leaders worked to patch the societies marred by decades of terrorism, known as
The Troubles, to heal societal tensions, stop religious violence, and form a lasting peace between
Protestants and Catholics (Sandal 2018).
The strength and composition of relations of which the diaspora community is interested
in pursuing is a significant factor that enables a homeland to engage in reunification measures in
both the short-term and long-term prospects. A cohesive cultural connection to the homeland is
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essential to the security and stability of internal relations, society, and governance following the
annexation or reorganization of borders. Further, this “oneness” of ties to the ethnic history and
interests allow for cohesive and streamlined domestic policy from the state’s governing bodies,
further allowing the now-reunified populations an unthreatened right to freedoms, rights, and
representation.
This cultural “oneness” may prove to be elusive, as research by Saideman and Ayers
suggests there may be a constructed social hierarchy within those of the same ethnic allegiance
(2005). In irredentism, the guiding force of nationalism—“the beliefs and attitudes defining who
is the us, who are the relevant others, [and] the strength of feelings about various
communities”—may be less contingent on overarching ethnic allegiance, but rather on moments,
crises, and struggles experienced by the diaspora versus the homeland (Saideman 2005).
Superseding ethnic allegiance is a spectrum of “us-ness and other-ness” that lifts domestic ethnic
kin above the diaspora community, perhaps because this group has encountered a series of life
experiences vastly different from those within the homeland (Saideman 2005). While the fate
and security of ethnic kin is high on the list of concerns for the homeland’s citizenry, the
interests of domestic kin may be more important—“they want their kin to do well, but to stay
put” (Saideman 2005). This may not always be the case, however, as some states may
experience the same, or similar, conflicts, discrimination, or crises as their diasporas, thus
eliminating the potential strain or social distance between the homeland and the diaspora.
For decades, the Macedonian diaspora in Greece maintained a consistently strong level of
interest in returning to the Macedonian homeland, and the Macedonian homeland continued to
express great support for their return. However, a few key factors have prevented this
reorganization from occurring. The Macedonian diaspora stems far beyond Northern Greece—
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Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia each maintain a significant community of
Macedonians founded following multiple post-war annexations and the partitioning of
Macedonia. While ethnic ties to the homeland remain strong, the geographic proximity to, and
the fractured nature of, the homeland may lessen the imminent desire to reunify. Additionally, as
previously discussed in this paper, Macedonia is often plagued with economic issues, corrupt
leaders and police, and downfalls of its own. Unemployment is high, GPD is low, and the state
remains unrecognized by multiple other international actors and continues to be prevented from
gaining stronger international legitimacy through other channels. Macedonian families send
their sons to work across borders and rely on the remittances sent home, highlighting the
logistical dilemmas of poverty and concerns of unemployment within Macedonia itself. If the
homeland cannot support its current kin, is it rational for dispersed kin to return home, knowing a
secure livelihood is still not guaranteed?
In the 2014 case of Crimea, Russia’s ability to reclaim the Crimean peninsula was
enabled by the significant majority of ethnic Russians occupying the peninsula, and their
overwhelming, decades-long desire to rejoin the Russian homeland. This was partially
sponsored by the return of the Tatar minority in the 1990s—which heightened community
tensions and forced ethnic Russians into ghetto housing—and modern denials of the right to
speak the Russian language, have or achieve representation in the political sector, and a series of
reversals on policies and plans that were formerly pro-Russian in nature (“Rights in Retreat”
2014; “Ukraine Crisis” 2014). Public interest in realigning with the Russian homeland was high,
and given the opportunity, Russia came to the rescue.
Table 1, below, illustrates the presence and severity of these three factors in terms of the
Russia-Crimea and Greece-Macedonia case studies.
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Table 1. Attendance of Dominant Factors in Case Studies
Case
Studies

RussiaCrimea
GreeceMacedonia

Economic-Power
Differentials
(money=ability=power)

Interest in International
Organization
Membership

Diaspora Relations/
Strength of the
Connection to the
Homeland

degree

yes/no

interest in
reunification

HIGH

NO

HIGH

HIGH*

YES

MODERATE-HIGH**

*economic crisis in Greece may account for changes in this classification
**economic and employment troubles in Macedonia may account for the lessening of this
interest, in terms of rationality and logistics

Minor Contributing Factors. In addition to economic-power relations, international organization
membership, and diaspora relations, a few other factors may provide minor influence over the
success or failure of an irredentist conflict. In reviewing the case of Russia-Crimea, an
overlooked pattern emerged: the presence of domestic and international opportunity. Internal
volatility due to Ukrainian President Yankovych’s corruption scandals, removal of power, and
the public’s corresponding mass protests created the opportunity to emerge as a force of support
and stability in a struggling ally’s state. A “Putin the Improviser” theory was proposed to
explain Putin’s humble obligation to secure and protect regional and neighborly interests—not
because he wanted to reclaim territory, but because domestic instability quickly becomes
transnational instability (Treisman 2016). Putin had the overwhelming support of the ethnic
Russian diaspora on the peninsula, which was actively looking to realign with the homeland after
recent Ukrainian politics looked to align with the West over Russia.
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Further, this altruistic intent to “save” the weak and struggling Crimea from collapse
lacked the proper checks by other states at the top of the international power hierarchy. Highprofile international distractions—US President Barack Obama’s second inauguration, rising
North Korean nuclear tension, the 2014 Sochi Olympics, Edward Snowden’s NSA leaks, the
ousting of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi from power, and chemical attacks waged on
civilians by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad—captured and averted the international
community’s attention away from any signs of sharp power, propaganda campaigns, or low-key
infiltrations on behalf of Moscow.
While Greece and Macedonia’s irredentist conflict has continued for too long to be
distracted by international events, smaller states in the Balkans, like Macedonia, are easily
forgotten and overlooked compared to their more notable neighbors, i.e. Greece, Turkey, Italy,
the Middle East, and Western Europe. Additionally, the world’s focus on the War on Terror, the
Cold War (past or present), and the rise of ISIS within the Middle East diverts attention away
from less formally troublesome regions, like the Balkans. The status as a low-violence ethnic
conflict demotes the severity of the issue, in comparison to that of a heavily-armed ISIS.
However, some theories suggest that the Balkans has the potential to turn into the next Middle
East, due to heavy grievances with border assignments, diaspora abuses, and a toxic economic
system. Also, the Balkans, like the Middle East, is known for having a long history of regional
instability, civil war, and failed irredentist conflict.
Some scholars suggest that the presence of a fractured and violent regional history makes
the region inherently more susceptible to the same conflicts, by way of the domino theory of
violence and the spiral of violence theory (Auton 2016). In their most direct form, each of these
theories suggests that violence breeds violence through uncontrollable environmental factors.
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However, a counterargument to this suggests that the presence of such a history would dissuade
states from engaging in similar conflict, as the short-term and long-term consequences of
violence, civil war, and instability are intimately well known within all societies. In combination
with other economic, political, and power factors, this counterargument may provide insight into
Macedonia’s hesitation to engage in irredentist conflict with Greece.
Table 2, below, illustrates the presence of these minor contributing factors within the
Russia-Crimea and Greece-Macedonia case studies.

Table 2. Attendance of Minor Contributing Factors in Case Studies
Case
Studies

RussiaCrimea
GreeceMacedonia

Opportunity & Weak
Leadership

Extended History of
Contention

Dispersal of
Diaspora/Size

degree

degree

size & distribution

HIGH

MODERATE

LARGE; WIDE

MODERATE*

MODERATE

UNKNOWN; MODERATE

*A series of coups and corruption scandals have plagued Macedonia, but the absence of
mass protests or the need for international intervention may lessen this degree

Following this analysis, if a combination of factors does enable successful irredentist
conflict, can irredentist conflict be a truly beneficial and effective policy option? Does the
results of a successful case of irredentism produce results that align with the interests of the
citizenry and the state? In addition to restoring the freedoms and rights previously denied to the
ethnic diaspora, fostering greater social cohesion, and promoting representation of interests,
states and regime leaders can benefit from higher popularity, an edge above political opponents,
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and a unified body without significant factions that allow for streamlined policy and easy
political progress.
Is it Effective?
Interests of the Citizen. Does successful irredentist intervention effectively benefit the interests
of the citizenry? Maybe. Uniting a minority diaspora community back to the ethnic homeland
immediately enables the newly integrated ethnic kin into a majority-led society looking to
represent their interests. In government and society both, formerly persecuted or oppressed
individuals are now granted exceedingly beneficial expansions in their representation, freedoms,
opportunities, and social cohesion. In the Russia-Crimea case, the diaspora communities gained
the freedom to join in political discourse, run for seats in Parliament or a Cabinet, and obtain
legitimate representation on social, cultural, or political issues. Ethnic Russians in Crimea had
reportedly high approval ratings of their newfound Russian geopolitical status, as Russian
domestic and foreign policy was increasingly kinder and better suited for their interests and
culture (Pinkham 2017). However, for non-Russians newly annexed into the Russian
Federation’s reign, this streamlined approach to policymaking may be extremely counteractive
and detrimental to the safety and security of their interests, as revenge-seekers may explicitly
target previously-oppressive populations.
For the reunified diaspora, annexation, absorption, or realigned borders may grant a
greater sense of representation, empowerment, and strength within the entire international
system, thus benefitting societal and personal interests of this population. Conversely, the
psychological effects of being a small minority in conflict with a larger majority—experiencing
abuses on basic human rights, limited freedoms, segregated housing, or denied right to speak a
native language—can be increasingly damaging.
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However, as witnessed in the Russia-Crimea case, annexation may have an adverse effect
in the international system, as the majority of top world powers have decried Russia’s actions as
illegitimate, illegal, and intentional acts of malicious destabilization. Combating domestic
illegitimacy from the host nation is also increasingly difficult. Many diaspora communities are
repeatedly denied representation or recognition due to inaccuracies of government-sponsored
censuses (US Bureau of Democracy 2016).
In reuniting those repressed by other regimes into the ethnic homeland, precious
freedoms are returned: the simple right to speak a language or be taught in a school that speaks
the native diaspora language, the right to attend a school, or gain employment, healthcare, and
legitimate shelter. The freedom to organize, to be politically active, or to express views, long
denied by many majority governments to suppress dissent and secure a monopoly on power, are
immediately given to individuals long deprived of a voice, or outlet to speak.
In bringing the ethnic kin back to the ethnic homeland, representation, recognition,
freedoms, and basic opportunities each play into an even greater sense of unity. Swells of
nationalism and patriotism boosted Vladimir Putin’s popularity by 30 percent to an astronomical
90 percent from Russian citizens (Nardelli 2015). Finally free from decades or centuries of
oppression and repression, scapegoating and segregation, a celebration of strengthened culture
and belonging boosts social, human, and community interests of the diaspora and homeland kin
alike.
States’ Interests. The positives of irredentist actions do not stop at the citizenry. While states’
benefits appear to be much more narrow, states still benefit from a streamlined foreign and
domestic policy agenda. Following irredentist activity, it is increasingly clearer which interests
the state should pursue, as there is an even greater majority population outnumbering the much
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smaller minorities. In terms of personal political gain, Vladimir Putin and Slobodan Milošević,
both benefitted from increased political popularity against electoral opponents in the pursuit of
irredentist claims (Ambrosio 2016; Pinkham 2017).
Then again, this may be where states’ benefits end. Irredentist interventions may affect
regional stability, causing refugee crises—as witnessed in Russia’s occupation of the Crimean
peninsula—or igniting civil wars—as seen in Israel and Palestine (“Crimea Profile” 2018).
Likewise, the arrangement of newly-annexed ethnicities—i.e. miniscule clusters of Tatars and
Ukrainians absorbed into the Russian Federation—within the social hierarchy of the homeland
raises the potential for revenge-motivated human rights violations by civilians and government
institutions alike, which only furthers the cycle of violence and deepens ethnic divides within the
region. Further, in revisiting the Rational Choice theory, war is economically and politically
costly. Trade partnerships, oil deals, political alliances, counterterrorism forces, economic
benefits from tourism, and the security of a leader’s own reign each may be jeopardized in the
pursuit of irredentist conflict.

Limitations
This research, and the approach taken to conduct this research, encountered a series of
limitations and caveats. Irredentism, diverged from ethnic- and group-based conflict, is naturally
afflicted by a long series of compounding, nearly inseparable factors that contribute to the
success or failure of the mission. Because of this, difficulties in clearly identifying and defining
variables were frequent roadblocks, especially regarding the diaspora relations factor.
Intentionally skewed census data, the lack of comprehensive records, and manipulated reports of
abuses prevented the true understanding of the size of the diaspora, the overall severity and
frequency of the abuses.
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At this time, due to the lack of sufficient resources on the Internet, and the lack of
trustworthy or legitimate resources provided by states or international organization (States block
access to regions where minorities are forced to live.), I decided to focus solely on the diaspora’s
social connections to the homeland, with the intention to continue researching to expand and
uncover the importance of severity of abuses and the size of the diaspora.
Due to the varying nature, patterns, and execution of irredentist conflict, difficulties were
also faced in forming the clear definition of irredentism. Similarly, this research was also
exposed to divergences between case studies, which interfered with clean, linear analyses of my
chosen factors in multiple settings. As previously stated in my methodology, in preparing for
these divergences, this research aims to highlight and discuss popular and significant
contributing factors, rather than propose a definitive framework for the analysis of irredentist
activity.
Furthermore, the nature of this research was based on a qualitative design. I relied on
documentaries, country reports, maps, government documents, and scholarly articles to identify
variables and obtain my conclusions. This research does not contain extensive quantitative data,
significance tests, or statistical reviews, which exposes my argument to issues of opinion and
subjectivity.
Finally, there is great debate over validity in Russia’s cited motive for the 2014
annexation of the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine. While Russian President Vladimir Putin has
officially declared the aggressive takeover of Crimea as an act of irredentism in an effort to
ensure the protection and representation of the ethnic Russian kin inhabiting the peninsula, many
scholars and observers, including myself, have expressed concerns regarding this
characterization. Tending to favor a defense-based or security-based argument for imperialism,
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many in the field of international relations reject the official word of Moscow focused on ethnic
rights and human rights. This discrepancy, depending on the analysis and framework a scholar
chooses to employ, poses a significant detriment to my argument. In this research, I have chosen
to use the Russia-Crimea case study out of modernity, clarity of action, and government-cited
motivations.
Previously noted as the most pressing caveat, irredentist activity is intricately unique per
conflict. Therefore, it is increasingly difficult to definitively elaborate on a distinct structure,
pathway, or pattern of actions that is clear, consistent, and uniform in all cases of irredentism. I
have chosen, in this research, to place my emphasis on the factors that lead to success or failure
of irredentist missions, rather than refining classifications of conflict. The differences between
irredentism and moral imperialism are very slight—overlap is inherently unavoidable. Given the
tractability of these ethnic-relation-based conflicts, I have chosen to address the similarities and
continue to use the Russia-Crimea case study.

Conclusion
“The record of irredentism is generally one of self-destruction,” writes Saideman and
Ayers (2005). While it is true that the predominance of irredentist cases have failed to reunify
the homeland and diaspora, and while most irredentist states anticipate severe political and
economic repercussions from the international community, irredentist leaders place potential
domestic and international costs behind the nationalistic interests of the domestic majority in
choosing to engage in these policies (Saideman 2005).
Successful irredentist conflict brings a greater sense of social cohesion, personal
empowerment, and national pride to the forefront of civil society. Long-coveted freedoms, such
as obtaining an education, employment, or financial stability and the rights to assemble, practice
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religion, or celebrate culture are restored to the ethnic kin, drastically improving their standards
of living.
The homeland’s promise to provide safety and security, and to serve the interests of the
diaspora has provokes a higher rate of satisfaction within the homeland, as witnessed in the
Russia-Crimea case. Following Crimea’s annexation, ethnic Russians within Crimea and the
homeland both reported higher satisfaction with Putin’s decision to protect and secure the rights
of their ethnic kin through irredentist, people-first policy strategies that went against the post-war
international order (Treisman 2016; Pinkham 2017). Because of Putin’s overt defiance towards
the West and international norms, Putin’s approval ratings increased significantly, and this swell
of nationalistic support secured Putin’s regime, previously embroiled in domestic turmoil,
although new reports say this swell of support could be fading (“Crimea Consensus” 2017;
Nardelli 2015). In addition to increased support for the regime, states also benefit from a unified
populace, which enables the smooth passage of political activity without factions or protests by
significant minority populations.
However, perils brought by states engaging in irredentist conflict are too severe to ignore.
Internal instability breaches the borders, inciting tensions with border states, creating
community-wide disturbances, and rising ethnic tensions everywhere. The presence of
retaliatory policy or vicious treatment towards the minute ethnic factions forcibly seized into the
homeland is distressing, yet great difficulty remains in fully understanding the expanse of this
issue. Local and state-controlled media often suppress reports of abuses on minorities’ human
rights, and authoritarian regimes frequently restrict or deny access to contentious regions,
preventing international monitors, IGOs/NGOs, and journalists from uncovering the true extent
of abuses or living conditions.
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Open conflict and internal instability can provoke an exodus of refugees to infiltrate
multiple surrounding states, igniting economic crises and social unrest. In reviewing the IsraelPalestine irredentist conflict, it is brought to light how the aggressive pursuit of territorial
disputes can evoke a near-civil war situation if states choose to employ violent tactics over
peaceful or diplomatic strategies. The resurgence of intra-state violence since 2015 has resulted
in thousands of Palestinian casualties, as Israeli forces continue to enforce severe and highly
discriminative policies through live gunfire, stabbings, and the use of military weaponry on
predominantly peaceful civilian uprisings near the Israeli-Palestinian border (Human Rights
Watch 2017).
Irredentism in its simplest form involves the absorption of territory and the people within
that territory. Disturbingly, this means that Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula also
included the annexation of a variety of native Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians. Both minority
groups were vehemently anti-Russia. The annexation and confinement of miniscule minorities
against their wishes only heightens ethnic tensions within the community and reverses the initial
justification and defense of irredentist action. If Russian policy is streamlined to benefit the
ethnic Russians and persecutes the Tatar and Ukrainian minorities, Ukraine may choose to
engage in irredentist conflict against Russia for their Ukrainian minority, which establishes the
potential for a continuous battle for minority rights and ethnic belonging that is extremely
detrimental to the short-term and long-term security, stability, and well-being of both states and
the entire surrounding region.
Finally, human, economic, environmental, and domestic and international costs are often
the defining factor as to whether State A chooses to engage in a conflict with State B. If the
conflict is violent in nature, human lives are at risk due to the need for soldiers and the potential
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for nondiscriminatory attacks by the enemy state. Additionally, war is an economically draining
activity. Millions of dollars are spent each year with little-to-no return or progress. Extensive
funds are needed to train and transport soldiers, provide food and medical resources, and procure
weaponry, and smaller, less economically privileged states are unable to shell out the costs
necessary to win a long-term battle.
Additionally, smaller states are frequently reliant on outside allies to execute expensive
logistical support, lend modern weapons, and provide troop and resource assistance. These
smaller states, therefore, are at the mercy of their allies’ requests or limitations, whereas larger,
more powerful, more economically autonomous states are free to move politically without
factoring in outside interests or constraints. Larger states are not as tied to acting in accordance
with alliances or international organizations as weaker states are. The political costs of losing
strategic allies or membership are far more detrimental to a state like Macedonia than a state like
Russia.
Consequences of irredentist action expand further than regional instability, displaced
persons, and infighting. Disputes over the legitimacy of reunifying the diaspora territory to the
homeland, as well as concerns over upsetting the existing balance of power within the region
also arise following the close of successful irredentist conflict. Russia’s annexation of Crimea
continues to be denounced by the West and many European nations as an illegitimate sham over
four years after the conflict was settled, which only increases the diplomatic and political strain
between Russia and the West (Pinkham 2017). Reorganization of power dynamics is also a
concerning side effect of successful irredentist conflict. Nazi Germany’s sudden and unexpected
dominance within Western Europe clearly outline the dilemma of an unbalanced power system,
and the lack of international checks and policing on such power increases is alarming.
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Finally, the presence of conflict, whether violent or not, severely scars the tourism and
investment sectors within a state or region. Following Catalonia’s independence referendum,
social unrest, clashes with police, and the exile of politicians, multiple investors pulled business
bases out of Spain, as civilian investment dropped and markets appeared increasingly unstable
(Minder 2017). The tourism sector is also affected by both violent and tense conflict, as
vacationers heed warnings of unrest, violence, and heightened insecurity. A visitor’s country of
citizenship may also release warnings against travel to conflicted areas or place bans on traveling
to the specific state or region due to significant security risks.
Considering the economic, political, social, and environmental risks of engaging in
irredentist conflict, the international community must take extra steps to ensure that peaceful,
nonviolent approaches to solving ethnic conflict are carried out. States choose to overlook
domestic and international costs to reunify the diaspora to the homeland, but this does not mean
these costs are irrelevant, and some states with large diasporas choose to avoid engaging in
irredentist conflict due to the severity and tractability of these risks. Some states fail to justify
the rationality of engaging in conflict to reunify a diaspora that is alike in ethnicity but vastly
different in life history and experiences. Some states with larger diasporas have no true
motivations for reunifying the diaspora—the commitment to good faith procedures remain intact
and the presence of threats to security are low.
However, the recklessness of arbitrary border assignments by third-party actors following
the end of conflicts must be addressed. Border lines that divide ethnic allegiances and create
massive gaps between the majority and minority create an environment prone to discrimination
and intrinsically place strain on any good faith agreements. These border assignments actively
work against the fundamental goals of peace and prosperity within the entire international
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community. State leaders and international organizations must commit to a better understanding
of ethnic concerns and ethnic politics in terms of international relations and regional unrest.
International organizations like the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the
European Union, in addition to state leaders and non-governmental organizations, must work to
reinforce the importance of rights and freedoms guaranteed to individuals under the United
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Collectively, the international community
must make a larger effort to understand the motivations, dynamics, and enabling factors that
decide the implementation and success of irredentist conflict, as ethnic-based conflict continues
to rise to the forefront of modern international relations.
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